Ultimately, the 2006 and 2008 elections do strengthen Fiorina's argument for sorting. The fact that control of the House, Senate, and Presidency swung from the Republicans to the Democrats does not in itself signal that voters had never sorted themselves out based on ideology. Two simple facts support this idea. First, a large part of Fiorina's argument is that the vast majority of the electorate are not that different, so for the middle of the middle-of-the-road voters the ideological or party identification is less durable over time and events or circumstance can swing their vote from one election cycle to the next. Second, the voting differentials in any single election race that have swung control to the Democratic Party are not that vast to suggest massive amounts of missorted voters still exist. Furthermore, even where large margins do exist, there are the effects of new voters to consider. With respect to the recent presidential election, Obama's victory was larger than both of President Bush's in terms of popular vote margin, but also in terms of total votes cast. The fact that new voters are emerging in the electorate, and perhaps "sorting" themselves as Democrats or liberals does not indict Fiorina's argument any more than the idea that the moderate, independent voters are still flexible and unlikely to reliably and completely assign themselves to a single party over the long term.
The Module 14 notes reference Fiorina attributing the result of the 2004 Presidential Election to the female vote; it also mentions that it can be easy to diagnose such a result when there is a significant difference in a given voting bloc from one election cycle to the next. Nonetheless, in analyzing Fiorina's contention by comparing the 2004 and 2008 exit polls, it is striking that the gap changed just as significantly among men - Democrats lost among men 45% to 53% in '04, and won 49% to 48% in '08. Women voted 52% to 46% in favor of Democrats in '04, and that went up to 56% in '08. The tides behind this change clearly must be from the middle, and in any case the sorting of voters into the ideologically correct party is bound to be an ongoing process. Another interesting gap shift from '04 to '08, which I believe also supports a case for the ongoing sorting of the electorate, is the vote of the youngest voters, 18-29 year-olds. In 2004, this group went 55% to 44% for the Democrats; in '08, this numbers swelled to a full 66% in favor of the Democrats. This is not to say that it can be expected that the Democratic candidate will have ~66% of the 18-29 vote in every election, but those voters are more likely to have correctly sorted themselves as Democrats and voted accordingly, and as such can expected to reliably vote Democratic, all other things being equal. Overall, I think it becomes clear that while it may the sorting hypothesis cannot and does not purport to be a predictor of how large the margins between voting blocs or parties may be, it is still a significant element in explaining and defining elections for a new political era.
Friday, December 12, 2008
Tuesday, December 2, 2008
Build-a-Party & Group Projects Analysis
Build-a-Party
Overall I am pleased with the final proposal my group (Group 6) came up with. If the premise of a Republican Party collapse were a reality, I would suspect that something like our party would be its replacement. Apparently other groups felt the same way, as it looks like every single group chose to build a party to take over the wake of a Republican collapse, and every group contained some element of a more socially liberal and true economic conservatism. Given the recent election results this isn't particularly suprising - choosing the GOP to collapse was the obvious choice since the Democrats just won the presidency and held both houses of Congress.
The platforms of each group's party were oriented towards different main issues but, again, tended towards social liberalism and fiscal conservatism. With everyone working with the premise that the GOP had collapsed, electoral strategies were focused on what the redrawn political map would look like for this new party if it could not reliably count on support of the old Republican base in the South and Great Plains. I know that our group and a couple of others addressed specifically the potential impact of smaller splinter parties under this hypothetical scenario and I think that is an important note, particularly with respect to expectations of party viability. It is almost easier to conceive of a new party candidate competing for (if not winning) the presidency in order to promote legitimacy for the congressional party candidates.
Group Work
The group member with whom I co-authored these two assignments was pro-active in setting and showing up to meeting times, reliable in coming to the table with ideas, and willing to put in time to get the job done. I couldn't ask for more. Were there supposed to be 4 people in the group? Yeah. Oh well. Being unconvinced that more is necessarily merrier, I would just reiterate that the group interactions that did take place were informative and productive. We intially met during the first project thru campfire.org, and used that as our meeting place each time after that to discuss or combine ideas. It would have even been easy for group members who weren't there to catch up and get on the next time we met since we posted transcripts and planned meetings through the D2L group messageboard. I am not sure if I can make any overly positive or negative generalizations based on these group projects about political communication and organization over the internet. As an asset to a team or group organizing effort the internet is absolutely a positive, but the motivation to organize still has to exist for people to take full advantage of it. People who want to be tuned in are tuned in - those who don't...aren't.
Overall I am pleased with the final proposal my group (Group 6) came up with. If the premise of a Republican Party collapse were a reality, I would suspect that something like our party would be its replacement. Apparently other groups felt the same way, as it looks like every single group chose to build a party to take over the wake of a Republican collapse, and every group contained some element of a more socially liberal and true economic conservatism. Given the recent election results this isn't particularly suprising - choosing the GOP to collapse was the obvious choice since the Democrats just won the presidency and held both houses of Congress.
The platforms of each group's party were oriented towards different main issues but, again, tended towards social liberalism and fiscal conservatism. With everyone working with the premise that the GOP had collapsed, electoral strategies were focused on what the redrawn political map would look like for this new party if it could not reliably count on support of the old Republican base in the South and Great Plains. I know that our group and a couple of others addressed specifically the potential impact of smaller splinter parties under this hypothetical scenario and I think that is an important note, particularly with respect to expectations of party viability. It is almost easier to conceive of a new party candidate competing for (if not winning) the presidency in order to promote legitimacy for the congressional party candidates.
Group Work
The group member with whom I co-authored these two assignments was pro-active in setting and showing up to meeting times, reliable in coming to the table with ideas, and willing to put in time to get the job done. I couldn't ask for more. Were there supposed to be 4 people in the group? Yeah. Oh well. Being unconvinced that more is necessarily merrier, I would just reiterate that the group interactions that did take place were informative and productive. We intially met during the first project thru campfire.org, and used that as our meeting place each time after that to discuss or combine ideas. It would have even been easy for group members who weren't there to catch up and get on the next time we met since we posted transcripts and planned meetings through the D2L group messageboard. I am not sure if I can make any overly positive or negative generalizations based on these group projects about political communication and organization over the internet. As an asset to a team or group organizing effort the internet is absolutely a positive, but the motivation to organize still has to exist for people to take full advantage of it. People who want to be tuned in are tuned in - those who don't...aren't.
Monday, November 24, 2008
Critical Eras
John Aldrich, in his 1999 article “Political Parties in a Critical Era,” suggests that substantial changes in party leadership, changes in public beliefs and values, and changes in voting patterns are the baseline for the argument that the 1990’s are a critical era (Aldrich 1999, p28). I believe that he is right that all these variables are present in the 1990’s and lend credence to calling it a critical era. However, one of the essential parameters of V.O. Key’s definition of a critical era is “one of rapid change leading to a new period of relative stability” (Aldrich 1995, p261). Any period of relative stability in this case would have been very short – starting sometime during the Clinton administration and ending with the 2006 elections. Restricting the definition of the new critical era to the 1990’s misses the larger picture of changing party leadership, changes in public beliefs, and changes in voting patterns; these patterns have been in flux from 1994 to at least 2006 (or 2008 if you prefer), with no long-term equilibrium having revealed itself as of yet.
I would suggest that by the definitions of Keys and Aldrich, among others, either the 1990’s were a critical era that was punctuated by an unusually short period of equilibrium that quickly encountered another critical era; or the critical era is more properly extended into 21st century and still awaits the long-term equilibrium that the theory proposes. I believe that under the latter scenario, the critical era model proposed by Keys and Aldrich can still apply. Beginning with the 1994 elections, however, there has simply been little evidence for the long-term lock on the Presidency for Democrats or on Congress for the Republicans that Aldrich forecast as evidence for the introduction of the new stable era (Aldrich 1999, p14). Whether this equilibrium will ensue post-2008 remains to be seen, but is it not perfectly reasonable to imagine critical elections similar to 1994 and 2006 as soon as 2016 or 2018? If not, the scenario fits quite cleanly into Keys and Aldrich’s model. If so, it seems fair to suggest that the more frequent occurrence of critical elections is causing shorter periods of stability and equilibrium, and vice versa.
I would suggest that by the definitions of Keys and Aldrich, among others, either the 1990’s were a critical era that was punctuated by an unusually short period of equilibrium that quickly encountered another critical era; or the critical era is more properly extended into 21st century and still awaits the long-term equilibrium that the theory proposes. I believe that under the latter scenario, the critical era model proposed by Keys and Aldrich can still apply. Beginning with the 1994 elections, however, there has simply been little evidence for the long-term lock on the Presidency for Democrats or on Congress for the Republicans that Aldrich forecast as evidence for the introduction of the new stable era (Aldrich 1999, p14). Whether this equilibrium will ensue post-2008 remains to be seen, but is it not perfectly reasonable to imagine critical elections similar to 1994 and 2006 as soon as 2016 or 2018? If not, the scenario fits quite cleanly into Keys and Aldrich’s model. If so, it seems fair to suggest that the more frequent occurrence of critical elections is causing shorter periods of stability and equilibrium, and vice versa.
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Lieberman is a POS
The first question for the week is to determine whether or not Joe Lieberman is a Democrat. I suppose he would tell you that he is not, but I think that most of the available evidence leans towards saying that he is - much to the chagrin of other members of the Democratic party-in-government - actually a Democrat. Aldrich notes that legislation is dependent the formation of voting majorities in Congress (p195) and the only clear expression of this is the voting records of particular members. The model he offers for determining a "party vote" accepts the fact that there is a lot of missing information - the data will not tell us why a member voted the way they did or what other forms of the legislation did not make it out of committee, among other subjective factors (p196). Nonetheless, a voting record is the best available data for determining preferences in comparison to other members of Congress. Turning to Lieberman specifically, his voting record is strong in terms of party votes with Democrats on a broad range of issues (http://www.votesmart.org/issue_rating_category.php?can_id=53278). Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean recently put the number for Lieberman casting Democratic party-line votes at about 90% (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/18/dean-applauds-move-to-kee_n_144667.html) - with the glaring exception of the military and national defense issues that have become more prevalent in recent years, causing the well-publicized rift between Lieberman and the party that ultimately resulted in him losing the Democratic primary and subsequently leaving the party in 2006.
Lieberman continued to caucus with the Democratic Party, and retained his seniority with regard to committees in the last session of Congress. When compared to all members of Congress across the entire spectrum of congressional business, it is difficult not to categorize Lieberman as a relatively liberal Democrat - it is only when taking into account his support of President Bush and the Republicans with regard to particular miltary and national defense issues that the case can be made otherwise. Quoting DNC Chairman Dean from the above article, "Why not allow him to vote with us on 90 percent of the stuff?" I think it is hard to make a case that someone who has a long and relatively high-profile history with the party that he votes with 90% of the time, changed his party affiliation to "Independent Democrat" rather than simply "Independent", and continues to caucus with other party members is not a member of the party-in-government as defined by Aldrich, or based on any objective criteria whatsoever.
That said, the aforementioned clashes with other Democrats and party leadership, and Lieberman's ardent support of GOP presidential candidate John McCain over the past year, many in the party feel that some sort of retribution may be in order. The question of what the Democrats should do with him appears to already have been answered - they decided by a comfortable 42-13 margin to allow Lieberman to keep his seniority and his committee chairmanship (http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/18/blogtalk-the-lieberman-vote/), perhaps due in party to the support of President-elect Obama and concerns that his message of bipartisanship could be undermined by the Democratic Senators marginalizing a veteran (albeit Junior) Senator as a form of political retribution for supporting McCain. Not all in the party were satisfied with this decision, particularly in his home state of Connecticut where Democrats are concerned with the down-ticket effects on others of allowing Lieberman to go "unpunished." There are legitimate concerns on behalf of the state Democrats which add another dimension to what it means to be a part of the party-in-government - the way in which a particular party member is seen, especially at such a high level, can have serious ramifications for other party members. I do not think at this time that those concerns outweigh the previously discussed qualities that make Lieberman a member of the Democratic party-in-government. I think that when he is up for re-election again, that will be a dimension of the contest that voters will decide upon. But under no circumstances do I believe that the party should unilaterally force someone who votes with them, on almost every possible issue except one, out of the committee or caucus system based on publicly supporting the opposing party's candidate in one race. Whether it will cost him his seat is, again, for the voters to decide.
Lieberman continued to caucus with the Democratic Party, and retained his seniority with regard to committees in the last session of Congress. When compared to all members of Congress across the entire spectrum of congressional business, it is difficult not to categorize Lieberman as a relatively liberal Democrat - it is only when taking into account his support of President Bush and the Republicans with regard to particular miltary and national defense issues that the case can be made otherwise. Quoting DNC Chairman Dean from the above article, "Why not allow him to vote with us on 90 percent of the stuff?" I think it is hard to make a case that someone who has a long and relatively high-profile history with the party that he votes with 90% of the time, changed his party affiliation to "Independent Democrat" rather than simply "Independent", and continues to caucus with other party members is not a member of the party-in-government as defined by Aldrich, or based on any objective criteria whatsoever.
That said, the aforementioned clashes with other Democrats and party leadership, and Lieberman's ardent support of GOP presidential candidate John McCain over the past year, many in the party feel that some sort of retribution may be in order. The question of what the Democrats should do with him appears to already have been answered - they decided by a comfortable 42-13 margin to allow Lieberman to keep his seniority and his committee chairmanship (http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/18/blogtalk-the-lieberman-vote/), perhaps due in party to the support of President-elect Obama and concerns that his message of bipartisanship could be undermined by the Democratic Senators marginalizing a veteran (albeit Junior) Senator as a form of political retribution for supporting McCain. Not all in the party were satisfied with this decision, particularly in his home state of Connecticut where Democrats are concerned with the down-ticket effects on others of allowing Lieberman to go "unpunished." There are legitimate concerns on behalf of the state Democrats which add another dimension to what it means to be a part of the party-in-government - the way in which a particular party member is seen, especially at such a high level, can have serious ramifications for other party members. I do not think at this time that those concerns outweigh the previously discussed qualities that make Lieberman a member of the Democratic party-in-government. I think that when he is up for re-election again, that will be a dimension of the contest that voters will decide upon. But under no circumstances do I believe that the party should unilaterally force someone who votes with them, on almost every possible issue except one, out of the committee or caucus system based on publicly supporting the opposing party's candidate in one race. Whether it will cost him his seat is, again, for the voters to decide.
Wednesday, November 12, 2008
Prospects for Republican Failure
The Republican Party has been on the (very) short end of the 2006 and 2008 elections. However, I think it is far too early and would be far too presumptous to claim that two elections have sounded the death knell for a party so entrenched and institutionalized in the American system. I think it is perhaps fair to say that the 2006 and 2008 elections may force the Republican Party into a realignment of its electoral platforms, issues, and especially campaign strategies. The 2008 election was set up well for Democrats - the presidential incumbent was horrifically unpopular and in the middle of economic meltdown, the Democrats put forward a magnetic candidate whose nomination (much less his election) would be historic in itself, and additionally the campaign was organized, structured, and disciplined in new ways that gave them an extended advantage (http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/11/11/america/dean.php). As Nagourney notes in this article, there were many things at play, including the long and highly competitive nomination process for the Democrats. On top of that there is the simple and unusual math that put so many Republican and so few Democratic Senators up for re-election this year. Some year soon, that math will be reversed, and the partisan split in the Senate will again regress back towards the norm of a 50/50 split.
I think that in order for one to point to a collapse of the Republican Party, there has to be more than one or two election seasons of disappointment and lost seats. No one knows what will happen during Obama's first term as President. If the Democrats again gains seats in the midterm elections, and Obama wins re-election in a Reagan/Mondale-type landslide while the Democrats push towards 350 House and 70 Senate seats, then perhaps the collapse of the Republican Party is at hand. As it is I think it is more likely just part of natural political cycles, although admittedly the cycles do appear to be becoming more frequent - in my lifetime alone I can reference the 1994 Republican Revolution along with the 2002, 2006, and 2008 elections as those that have seen phenomenal, policy-changing partisan shifts take place.
In comparison with Aldrich's take on the development of party systems, I also do not see a correlation to make to substantiate a claim that the Republican Party faces collapse at our present time. Aldrich noted the near elimination of the Federalist Party from the national legislature after 1812 (p 98) and the rapid splintering of the Whig Party in the early 1850s (p 135) as the Republican Party rose to prominence. Neither of these scenarios fits the present case...but it may soon. As I said earlier, I do think the Republicans do have some choices to make about their direction and organization - they cannot wait around for Obama or the Democrat-controlled Congress to screw up and hope it buys them a big showing in the midterms or in 2012. Whether or not the new political map the Democrats are trying to create is something that they can perpetuate over time remains to be seen, but if the Republicans will certainly lose if they don't even show up for the fight.
I think that in order for one to point to a collapse of the Republican Party, there has to be more than one or two election seasons of disappointment and lost seats. No one knows what will happen during Obama's first term as President. If the Democrats again gains seats in the midterm elections, and Obama wins re-election in a Reagan/Mondale-type landslide while the Democrats push towards 350 House and 70 Senate seats, then perhaps the collapse of the Republican Party is at hand. As it is I think it is more likely just part of natural political cycles, although admittedly the cycles do appear to be becoming more frequent - in my lifetime alone I can reference the 1994 Republican Revolution along with the 2002, 2006, and 2008 elections as those that have seen phenomenal, policy-changing partisan shifts take place.
In comparison with Aldrich's take on the development of party systems, I also do not see a correlation to make to substantiate a claim that the Republican Party faces collapse at our present time. Aldrich noted the near elimination of the Federalist Party from the national legislature after 1812 (p 98) and the rapid splintering of the Whig Party in the early 1850s (p 135) as the Republican Party rose to prominence. Neither of these scenarios fits the present case...but it may soon. As I said earlier, I do think the Republicans do have some choices to make about their direction and organization - they cannot wait around for Obama or the Democrat-controlled Congress to screw up and hope it buys them a big showing in the midterms or in 2012. Whether or not the new political map the Democrats are trying to create is something that they can perpetuate over time remains to be seen, but if the Republicans will certainly lose if they don't even show up for the fight.
Wednesday, November 5, 2008
Election '08
Well as it turned out it appears that our group prediction was quite accurate. The numbers I will be referencing come from MSNBC's website here: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23887017?GT1=43001 . They have some nice interactive maps by county that are interesting. The total number of votes cast for the two major candidates is given at 63.5 million for Obama and 56.1 for McCain. This is a bit lower than we had anticipated, and while the numbers are not yet final it is probably unlikely that there will be 10 million more votes added to that total as we had predicted (68.5M to 59.8M). Nonetheless, our predicted split is about the same as the actual at just over 53% of the two-party vote for Obama. North Carolina, which we had going very narrowly to Obama, is still listed at 50/50 as of this writing. We had predicted Indiana to go 51/49 to McCain, but Obama took that state too - the only state we forecast incorrectly (with the understanding that NC could be added to that very short list). In terms of percentages we were generally with a margin of +/- 3%, which I was happy with and I imagine was relatively normal for other groups as well. Outside of the context of the group project the election was very much in line with what I expected and hoped for (if I may editorialize), although I did think that at least one of Florida, Ohio, or Pennsylvania would ultimately break for McCain and lengthen at least the on-air speculation time for political commentators, if not the suspense about the outcome of the election itself.
Moving on to the congressional elections, the Democrats now have 259 seats in the House of Representatives, expanding their current majority by about 20 seats (depending on if that number holds up). Our group had projected 258 seats for the Democrats in the next Congress, which also turned out to be fairly accurate. As for the Senate, again we accurately forecast the winner in almost all cases and generally within a reasonable margin in terms of percentage. The Georgia, Minnesota, and Oregon contests are apparently still too close to call - we had Minnesota and Oregon going to the Democratic candidate. In any case it appears the Democrats will not enjoy the filibuster-proof 60 seats they hoped for - but they got close.
So did all this amount to an electoral mandate for Obama and the Democratic Party? I think it absolutely does. Some will say it is not, perhaps referencing that it was not a historically massive win in terms of either the popular vote or electoral votes, but the Obama victory combined with the substantial Democratic pickups in both the House and Senate delegations nonetheless constitutes a clear directive by the electorate. With respect to President-elect Obama specifically, I mentioned before that I expected McCain to somehow pull out a win in Florida, Ohio, or Pennsylvania. He lost them all. I think the idea of deriving an electoral mandate from this win comes with the fact that Obama won every state a Democrat was supposed to win, every state that is traditionally a toss-up or "battleground" in presidential elections, and then a few states that nobody would have expected him to. That said, in light of all the coverage and polling data that many of us have been looking at for the better part of a year now...purely in terms of numbers, nothing that happened yesterday should have come as much of a shock. The data said that Obama had about a 6-point lead nationally, it said he was ahead in Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, and it said that he and McCain were running very closely in a handful of traditionally red states. All of that turned out to be very true.
Moving on to the congressional elections, the Democrats now have 259 seats in the House of Representatives, expanding their current majority by about 20 seats (depending on if that number holds up). Our group had projected 258 seats for the Democrats in the next Congress, which also turned out to be fairly accurate. As for the Senate, again we accurately forecast the winner in almost all cases and generally within a reasonable margin in terms of percentage. The Georgia, Minnesota, and Oregon contests are apparently still too close to call - we had Minnesota and Oregon going to the Democratic candidate. In any case it appears the Democrats will not enjoy the filibuster-proof 60 seats they hoped for - but they got close.
So did all this amount to an electoral mandate for Obama and the Democratic Party? I think it absolutely does. Some will say it is not, perhaps referencing that it was not a historically massive win in terms of either the popular vote or electoral votes, but the Obama victory combined with the substantial Democratic pickups in both the House and Senate delegations nonetheless constitutes a clear directive by the electorate. With respect to President-elect Obama specifically, I mentioned before that I expected McCain to somehow pull out a win in Florida, Ohio, or Pennsylvania. He lost them all. I think the idea of deriving an electoral mandate from this win comes with the fact that Obama won every state a Democrat was supposed to win, every state that is traditionally a toss-up or "battleground" in presidential elections, and then a few states that nobody would have expected him to. That said, in light of all the coverage and polling data that many of us have been looking at for the better part of a year now...purely in terms of numbers, nothing that happened yesterday should have come as much of a shock. The data said that Obama had about a 6-point lead nationally, it said he was ahead in Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, and it said that he and McCain were running very closely in a handful of traditionally red states. All of that turned out to be very true.
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